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Abstract 
 
Researchers and practitioners seem to agree on 
the importance of boards of directors engaging in IT 
governance. Yet, only a minority of boards around 
the globe are taking up accountability for governing 
IT, pointing towards a knowing-doing gap. Efforts 
have been made to close this gap by creating 
implementation guidelines for this type of 
engagement. One of the most frequently mentioned 
guidelines is the implementation of an IT oversight or 
similar committee at board level. However, research 
shows that few boards have established such a 
committee, which might be caused by the lack of 
detailed guidance on the workings and role of such 
committees. This paper discusses the case of the 
University of Antwerp that has established two IT 
oversight committees at board level. We demonstrate 
how IT oversight committees can be established and 
how they fit into the role of the board with regard to 
IT governance. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Organizations are becoming increasingly 
dependent on IT for both innovation and operations. 
As a consequence, IT should become a part of 
strategy and risk discussions. As the boards’ 
responsibilities entail both strategy and risk 
management, we argue that boards can no longer 
fully delegate IT-related strategic decision making 
and control. Indeed, more and more research calls for 
engagement of the board of directors in IT 
governance [4, 13, 27]. At the same time, research 
shows that few boards take up accountability for 
governing IT [3, 4, 7, 28]. Hence, there seems to be a 
knowing-doing gap, suggesting that boards are 
struggling with the implementation of their IT 
governance duties. Some research efforts have been 
done towards closing this gap by presenting 
implementation guidelines.  
One of the most frequently mentioned guidelines 
is the implementation of an IT oversight (or similar) 
committee at the level of the board [8, 17, 18, 21, 22, 
26]. Yet, this recommendation does not seem to find 
its way to practice [3, 7, 13]. Therefore, a clear 
discrepancy exists between the recommendations 
provided by academics and the current state of 
practice. We found that even though IT oversight 
committees are the most frequently mentioned IT 
governance practice at the level of the board in 
academic research, little is said about the role and the 
workings of such a committee. That is, current 
research remains quite superficial. With this paper, 
we aim to contribute to the IT governance knowledge 
base by providing an example of how an 
organization, the University of Antwerp, has 
implemented an IT oversight committee and how this 
committee relates to the role of the board with regard 
to IT governance. Hence, our study is guided by the 
following two research questions: 
RQ1: Which role(s) can an IT oversight (or 
similar) committee at the level of the board of 
directors assume? 
RQ2: How can an IT oversight (or similar) 
committee at the level of the board of directors be 
organized? 
The remainder of this proceedings paper is 
structured as follows. First, a short description is 
provided on board level IT governance as well as an 
overview of the theories that are mentioned in the 
relating literature. Next, a summary of the literature 
on IT oversight (or similar) committees at the level of 
the board is presented. Third, the case of the 
University of Antwerp is described, shedding light on 
the specifics of an IT oversight committee. The paper 
ends with a discussion of what we can learn from the 
University of Antwerp case, a conclusion and some 
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limitations of this research and suggestions for future 
research. 
 
2. Board level IT governance  
 
IT governance, otherwise referred to as 
“enterprise governance of IT” or “corporate 
governance of IT”, is “an integral part of corporate 
governance, exercised by the Board, overseeing the 
definition and implementation of processes, 
structures and relational mechanisms in the 
organization that enable both business and IT people 
to execute their responsibilities in support of 
business/IT alignment and the creation of business 
value from IT-enabled investments” [10, 11]. This 
definition explicitly positions IT governance as a 
responsibility of the board of directors. This focus on 
the role of the board in IT governance is relatively 
new. Previously, IT governance research mainly 
focused on the IT decision-making structures at 
managerial-level and the contingencies that 
determine the best way to implement IT governance 
[6, 9, 30]. Recently, the role of the board in IT-
related strategic decision-making and control has 
gained attention.  
With regard to theoretical justification of IT 
governance at the level of the board, agency theory is 
the most widely used theoretical perspective [5, 16, 
20, 31]. This agency theory approach implies a focus 
on the control function of the board regarding IT. 
Some researchers use the resource-based view of the 
firm [26, 28] and the resource dependence theory [27, 
31] as a perspective to examine board level IT 
governance, considering boards and board members 
as potentially valuable resources for governing IT. 
Others suggest there is no one best way to implement 
or shape board level IT governance, building on 
contingency theory [4, 26, 27]. Similarly, Jewer and 
McKay [13] combine institutional and strategic 
choice theory to examine the antecedents and 
consequences of board level IT governance. They 
argue that the involvement of the board in IT 
governance depends on institutional pressures that 
influence the organization and the strategic choices 
made by the board itself. Others build on stewardship 
theory [26, 27], suggesting that managers are 
trustworthy stewards of the organization and they are 
in need of advice from the board of directors. Lastly, 
stakeholder theory is mentioned in board level IT 
governance research, implying that the board is 
responsible for the oversight of the main IT resources 
in support of all organization stakeholders [5]. These 
different theoretical paradigms imply several board 
roles regarding IT governance. That is, the board has 
a control, service and resource dependence role with 
regard to governing IT, as is proposed in corporate 
governance literature [14]. Furthermore, the 
engagement of the board in IT governance depends 
on several factors, including institutional pressures 
and board decisions. 
 
3. IT oversight (or similar) committees at 
the level of the board of directors 
 
The most frequently mentioned approach to 
increase board involvement in IT governance is the 
establishment of an IT oversight or similar committee 
at board level [8, 17, 18, 21, 22, 26]. Different 
authors use different terms to refer to such a 
committee; IT oversight committee [8, 17, 21], IT 
governance committee [17, 18], IT steering 
committee [22] and IT committee [26].  
Various committee responsibilities are mentioned 
in academic literature. Nolan and McFarlan [17] 
argue that an IT oversight committee is responsible 
for watching out for what competitors and other 
organizations are doing with technology. On the 
other hand, Oliver and Walker’s research [18] 
addresses the topic of software development projects 
and posits that the IT oversight committee is a body 
responsible for governing: “expenditure and 
realization of benefits of current and future IT 
investments”, “standards, risk and compliance” and 
“performance”. Posthumus, von Solms [21] argue 
that the IT oversight committee should ensure that IT 
is systematically added to the board’s agenda and that 
it is addressed through a structured approach. 
Moreover, it is the committee’s responsibility to 
make sure that the board possesses all information 
necessary for IT-related decision-making.  
Despite the advice of these studies to establish a 
board level IT oversight or similar committee, 
research points out that the occurrence of these 
committees in practice is rather low [3, 7, 13]. 
Figures ranging from 74.5% [3] to 91% [13] of 
survey respondents that indicate not having such a 
committee. On top of that, interviews with 
practitioners  show that some are not at all in favor of 
introducing such a committee, because of time 
constraints or because they do not believe that boards 
have the appropriate expertise [3, 13]. Coertze and 
Von Solms [7] warn for the pitfalls of establishing a 
committee at board level. They emphasize that even 
though a committee is established, the board still 
remains accountable. 
A contingency approach can be taken with regard 
to the implementation of an IT oversight or similar 
committee. Such a committee is not suited for every 
type of organization. The need depends on the role of 
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IT in the organization [8, 17, 21]. An important 
framework that can be used to describe the role of IT 
in the organization is the strategic impact grid 
developed by Nolan and McFarlan [17]. They posit 
that organizations can either have a defensive IT 
strategy, which focuses on operational reliability, 
ensuring smoothly running, secure, cost-effective IT 
systems or an offensive IT strategy, which considers 
IT as a strategic asset, enabling the organization to 
offer new products and services or to be more 
responsive to customer needs. Accordingly, the 
strategic impact grid which identifies four “IT use 
modes” based on the organization’s need for reliable 
IT and it’s need for new IT. Organizations in support 
mode only need technology to support employee’s 
activities. Factory mode organizations require highly 
reliable IT, but have a low need for new IT. When the 
need for new IT is high, but the organization does not 
rely on IT for the continuity of the business, 
turnaround mode applies. Organizations with a high 
need for both reliable and new IT are situated in the 
strategic mode. 
A similar perspective is used by Coertze and von 
Solms [8], who build on this notion of defensive and 
offensive IT strategy. They propose the idea of an IT 
alignment continuum that includes the organization’s 
IT dependency ranging from a defensive stance, 
where IT supports the business, to an offensive 
stance, where IT is the business. These researchers 
agree that in case of an offensive IT strategy or 
stance, a separate IT oversight or similar committee 
is required. The audit or risk management committee 
can take up the board level IT governance 
responsibilities in organizations with a defensive IT 
strategy or stance [17, 21]. The IT expertise within 
the board is also a determining factor for the need of 
an IT oversight committee. Boards with a limited 
level of IT expertise might benefit more from 
establishing such a committee [8]. 
In case an organization chooses to implement an 
IT oversight or similar committee, “the appropriate 
members and the chairman should be selected, the 
group’s relationship to the audit committee should be 
determined and the charter should be prepared”. 
Similar to other board level committees, like an audit 
or compensation committee, independent directors 
are considered to be appropriate members. As the 
committee’s focus is on IT, it should include at least 
one IT expert with profound knowledge of the 
business needs. The selection of the chairman 
depends on the role of IT in the organization. In case 
of support, factory or turnaround mode, the chairman 
should be an IT-savvy business executive. 
Organizations in strategic mode should appoint an IT 
expert as chair. Furthermore, a close relationship 
between the IT oversight committee and the audit 
committee is key. This could be facilitated by 
including the same person in both committees. [17] 
The board level committee responsible for IT 
governance should regularly report to the board of 
directors. Posthumus, von Solms [21] specify the 
frequency of this reporting. More specifically, in 
organizations in support mode, the committee should 
report to the board every 6 to 12 months, while the 
factory mode requires a report every 3 to 6 months. 
The IT oversight or similar committee in 
organizations in an offensive mode should report to 
the board every 3 months. An overview of the 
research on IT oversight or similar committees can be 
found in Table 1. 
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4. Research approach 
 
This paper describes the case of board level IT 
governance at the university of Antwerp. Case 
research perfectly fits our goal, as it is particularly 
relevant when the research question that is put 
forward seeks to explain how a social phenomenon 
works and requires an extensive and “in-depth” 
description of this phenomenon [32]. In order to truly 
understand the reason for the establishment of IT 
governance practices at the level of the board of 
directors and how these practices work at the 
University of Antwerp, multiple data sources were 
combined. Five stakeholders were interviewed using 
a semi-structured interview protocol: the rector, the 
chair of the board of administration, the two heads of 
the IT department and the head of the department of 
research and innovation. These stakeholders were 
actively involved in the establishment of the new IT 
governance practices. The interviews were conducted 
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in February, March and April of 2017 at the 
University of Antwerp. The interviews were recorded 
and transcribed to facilitate their processing. In 
addition, documents such as the meeting minutes of 
the board and the IT governance committee were 
examined. 
 
5. The case of the University of Antwerp  
 
In this section, the case of the University of 
Antwerp will be described. First, an introduction on 
the university and its top-level entities is provided. 
Second, the board level IT governance initiatives at 
the university are presented. 
 
5.1. Introduction to the case 
 
The University of Antwerp is a relatively young 
university, founded in 2003, fusing three separate 
university institutions that date back to 1965. 
Currently the university is responsible for the 
education of 20,367 students of 116 nationalities. The 
university staff consists of 5,398 people, including 
professors, assistants, researchers, education staff and 
administrative and technical staff. Its three core tasks 
are research, education and services.  
The central governance structure at the University 
of Antwerp consists of the rector, 3 central governing 
bodies and 9 central advisory bodies. The rector is 
the university’s highest academic official. He is 
appointed for a four-year term by the board of 
directors after university-wide elections. The central 
governing bodies include the board of directors, the 
executive board and the board of administration, 
which is responsible for the daily management of the 
university. These governing bodies are supported by 
the central advisory bodies, including the education 
board, the research board and the academic council 
for service to society. 
The IT department of the University of Antwerp 
maintains, manages and develops the IT 
infrastructure at the university. They provide 
solutions to support the three core tasks of the 
university: research, education and services, but also 
facilitate secondary processes such as administration 
and management. In addition, they provide direct 
support to end users and attend to the maintenance of 
the infrastructure. 
 
5.2. Board level IT governance at the 
University of Antwerp 
 
Like many organizations, the University of 
Antwerp has become increasingly dependent on IT. 
This increasing dependence on IT also entails a 
growing number of IT enabled investments that need 
to be carried out by the IT department. The IT 
department began to struggle with this great number 
of IT enabled investments. No central business forum 
existed to decide which projects would be executed 
and which would not, swamping the IT department 
with many requests they could not deliver against. 
This situation often led to frustration on the business 
side, a tension which was also reported to and known 
by some board members.  
Furthermore, in 2016, a new rector came at the 
head of the University of Antwerp. The newly 
appointed rector strongly believes that the 
organization should think about long term 
developments and how the university can adapt to 
these developments. More specifically, he stated that 
he thinks it is the task of the board of directors to 
create this long term vision, also regarding IT-related 
issues. 
Accordingly, the University of Antwerp decided 
to tackle the need to (1) establish a more formal IT 
portfolio management process that includes all 
relevant stakeholders, (2) increase the involvement of 
the board in this process and (3) ensure a more 
forward-looking approach.  
A widely acknowledged strategy to increase and 
improve the involvement of the board in IT-related 
decision making and control, is to enhance its IT 
expertise [13, 19, 29]. However, due to the nature of 
the board of directors at the university, there are not 
many options to thoughtfully alter its composition. 
When the University of Antwerp initiated more board 
level engagement in digital strategy and oversight, 
only 6 of the 25 members of the board were external 
directors. The internal directors were appointed after 
elections among the different university entities and 
students. From the 6 external members, the university 
could merely appoint 3. The others were selected by 
the minister for education, the governor of the 
province of Antwerp and the provincial superior of 
the society of Jesus, which made it difficult to 
increase the level of IT expertise among board 
members. Since September 1st 2017, the board is 
allowed to appoint 3 additional directors. This change 
will provide the university with the opportunity to 
slightly alter the composition of the board. As the 3 
additional members have not been appointed yet at 
the time of writing, the future will show whether this 
new arrangement will result in a higher level of IT 
expertise at the board of directors. 
Due to the limited level of IT expertise on the 
board, it makes sense to make sure this IT expertise is 
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present and IT-related debates are held in other 
structures that report to or advise the board. 
Accordingly, committees were created that include 
board members and that assist the board in IT-related 
decision making and control. Indeed, the creation of 
an IT oversight or similar committee at board level is 
a frequently mentioned approach in academic 
literature to increase board involvement in IT 
governance [8, 17, 26]. At the university, two such 
committees were created. One committee, the IT 
governance committee, considers rather short term 
decisions and is in charge of portfolio management of 
IT enabled investments. This committee is supported 
by the investment office. The other committee, the 
digital strategy think tank, considers the long term 
from more an outside-in perspective. The committees 
are presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.1. Guiding principles. When the University of 
Antwerp decided to act on the growing need for IT 
governance mechanisms, a set of guiding principles 
was agreed upon. These principles include: 
1. Transparency regarding investment criteria: 
the evaluation of proposed investments should be 
handled in a transparent way. Clear criteria should 
be created to decide whether or not to start an 
investment. 
2. Transparency regarding the investment 
budget: the size of the investment budget should 
be known at all times. 
3. Transparency regarding individual 
investments: for every investment a business case 
needs to be developed according to a standard 
form. Moreover, a business owner is appointed to 
each investment and no investments can be 
launched without a business owner.  
4. Transparency regarding the investment 
portfolio: all investments need to go through the 
same portfolio decision cycle so that a full and 
transparent view can be obtained.  
These guiding principles were used as a basis to 
create the board level IT governance structures that 
are described in the following sections.  
 
5.2.2. IT governance committee. The IT governance 
committee was established in 2015 and meets 3 times 
a year. The main goal of this committee is to manage 
the IT enabled investment portfolio more effectively 
and transparently and make sure it is in line with the 
overall organization strategy. From a board’s 
perspective, the committee should provide reasonable 
assurance that the university’s IT enabled 
investments are in line with the university strategy. 
Indeed, up until now, the main topic of the committee 
meetings has been which investments to execute. 
However, the interviewees indicated that in the 
future, other topics like project benefits delivery and 
the IT policy plan could be part of this meeting.  
Not all IT enabled investments pass by the IT 
governance committee. Rather operational 
investments – like the renewal of certain academic 
software licenses – are not discussed at this level of 
the organization, as these would overburden this 
forum. Instead, the committee focuses on more 
strategic and innovative projects, which cover about 
45% of the entire IT budget. 
Due to the democratic nature of the decision 
making culture at the university, it is crucial to 
include a broad delegation of people of the university 
in this committee. Hence, the goal was to create an 
entity that would represent all university entities as 
good as possible. The result is a committee that 
consists of 15 voting members and 30 advisory 
members. In addition, the chairman and vice-
chairman can invite internal or external experts that 
act as advisors. The rector is appointed chairman, the 
chair of the board of administration is the vice-
chairman. The 15 voting members are the rector, 2 
members of the Board of Administration, the 4 vice-
rectors, 3 members of the board of directors, 3 
members appointed by the Council of Deans and the 
2 heads of the IT department. 
The composition reveals that the board is actively 
engaged in the IT debate. Four directors were 
appointed voting members of the IT governance 
committee (including the rector) and all other 
directors are also welcome to join. Indeed, at the past 
committee meetings, attendance ranged from 4 up to 
8 directors. 
As the heads of the IT department are included in 
the committee, a certain level of IT expertise is 
present. However, the goal of the committee is not to 
go too much into the technical details, but to discuss 
the investments from a business perspective. Indeed, 
one of the heads of the IT departments states: 
“Within the IT governance committee we present the 
projects as understandable and as little technical as 
possible. This is also explicitly mentioned in the IT 
governance committee charter.” Of course, the 
Figure 1 IT oversight committees at the 
University of Antwerp 
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details must be considered at one point. Therefore, it 
was decided to establish an additional preparatory 
committee; the investment office. 
The investment office is responsible for preparing 
investments to be presented to the IT governance 
committee. More specifically, a scoring model, which 
is approved by the IT governance committee, is used 
to evaluate the fit with the organization strategy, the 
risks and the expenditure. This scoring model enables 
a fairly objective quotation of the investment. 
Investments are evaluated from a business as well as 
a technical perspective. For example, the match with 
the three core tasks of the university (education, 
research and services) is assessed. An overview of all 
the scoring criteria is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2 Scoring model 
Domain Criterion 
Business 
domain 
Strategic match domain education 
Strategic match domain research 
Strategic match domain services 
Administrative streamlining 
Management information 
Marketing / image 
Strategic match ICT policy plan 
Technology 
domain 
Strategic IS architecture 
Definitional uncertainty 
Technical uncertainty 
IS infrastructure risk 
 
For each of these criteria, underlying questions 
were developed that allow to come to a “green”, 
“yellow” or “red” score in a consistent way. Green 
represents a good match, yellow exemplifies a 
limited match and red suggests there is no match. In 
case the investment criterion is not applicable (e.g. an 
investment in a new online platform for research is 
not relevant for the education strategy) a “grey” score 
is used. At the end of this exercise, a scorecard is 
created, showing the benefits, risks and expenditure 
of each investment. The scores are presented using 
colors, as this enables the reader to evaluate the 
investment’s strengths and weaknesses at a glance.  
The investment office does not make any 
investment decisions but can conclude that a 
proposed investment is not yet fully defined and 
matured in the current business case document. As 
this is merely a supporting committee with a more in-
depth focus, it does not reside at the level of the 
board. The actual decision on whether or not to go 
through with an investment is made in the IT 
governance committee. However, the score 
determined by the investment office is crucial to 
make this decision. This is reflected in the IT 
governance committee agenda, which always 
includes the topics as shown in Table 3.  
Every meeting, an overview of the IT budget is 
provided, which is in line with the guiding principles 
regarding transparency that were established at the 
beginning of this venture. Furthermore, all 
investments in need of a go/no-go decision are 
discussed. First, the investment business case and the 
color code that is determined by the investment office 
are presented. Then, the committee discusses the 
investment. Lastly, it is decided whether or not the 
investment will be executed. 
 
Table 3 IT governance committee agenda - 
main topics 
IT governance committee agenda 
Budget overview 
Investments: 
 Investment business case 
 Color code resulting from scoring model 
 Discussion 
 Decision 
 
5.2.3. Digital strategy think tank. The other IT 
governance structure at the top-level of the university 
is the digital strategy think tank. The current rector 
started his term in 2016. From the beginning of his 
mandate, he stated he wants “an organization that is 
agile and thinks about future needs” and in support 
of that, he wants to free up the time of the board to 
execute this task. He argues that “IT is no longer a 
supporting frame, it is much more than that. We are 
at the beginning of an evolution and do not even 
realize what is in front of us. We need to think about 
the university in 20 years, IT in 20 years and the 
society in 20 years.” 
In light of these developments, he initiated the 
creation of the digital strategy think tank which meets 
several times a year (the meeting frequency is 
currently undefined, in 2017 four meetings took 
place).  
The goal of this committee is to consider long 
term developments that could influence the 
university. They consider both how emerging 
technologies can impact the university’s business 
model and strategy, as well as how challenges in 
society and markets could be addressed levering new 
technological innovations. One of the topics 
discussed was the fact that at a certain point in the 
future, more people will retire than enter the job 
market, which might trigger companies to hire 
students before they have finished their masters. This 
development could affect the university, as it might 
require students to obtain their master’s degree in a 
more flexible way, for example supported by e-
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learning. These kind of digital strategy discussions 
require a certain level of IT expertise, which is 
reflected in the composition of the committee. The 
members of the digital strategy think tank are the 
rector, the chair of the Board of Administration, 3 
professors with IT expertise, a board member with IT 
expertise and 4 members of the IT department. 
Similar to the IT governance committee, the 
board of directors is represented in the think tank; the 
rector and one other board member are included. The 
difference is that for the digital strategy think tank, 
they specifically opted to include a board member 
with IT expertise. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the two IT 
oversight committees at the University of Antwerp, 
their goal and members. 
 
Table 4 Overview IT oversight committees at 
the University of Antwerp 
Committee Goal Members 
IT 
governance 
committee 
Manage IT 
enabled 
investment 
portfolio more 
effectively and 
transparently and 
align it with 
overall 
organization 
strategy. 
 Rector  
 2 Members of the 
Board of 
Administration  
 The 4 vice-rectors 
 3 Members of the 
board of directors 
 3 Members 
appointed by the 
Council of Deans 
 2 Heads of the IT 
department 
Digital 
strategy 
think tank 
Keep an eye on 
the impact of 
technological 
developments on 
the university and 
consider how 
societal and 
market challenges 
could be addressed 
leveraging 
technology. 
 Rector 
 Chair of the 
Board of 
Administration 
 3 professors with 
IT expertise 
 A board member 
with IT expertise 
 4 members of the 
IT department 
 
 
6. Discussion  
 
This study on the board level IT governance 
committees at the University of Antwerp provides 
some unique insights with regard to the two research 
questions that contribute to the body of knowledge of 
board level IT governance research which are 
presented in this section. 
No consensus seems to exist on the role of an IT 
oversight committee at the level of the board of 
directors. The roles described in literature are (1) 
monitoring of competitors and other organizations 
with regard to their IT-related activities [17], (2) 
monitoring of IT project costs and benefits, risk and 
compliance and value delivery [18], (3) ensuring IT 
is a topic on the board agenda and (4) ensuring 
boards have the necessary information for IT 
decision-making [21]. The case of the University of 
Antwerp indicates that the role of the committee 
strongly depends on the needs of the organization. 
This is in line with the guidance provided in 
literature, which incorporates a contingency 
approach. Yet, current research focusses on the 
contingency factors that determine whether or not an 
organization should install an IT oversight or similar 
committee. Yet, this case study suggests that a 
contingency approach can also be taken towards the 
role of such a committee. At the University of 
Antwerp, the role of the IT governance committee 
corresponds to the role described by Oliver and 
Walker [18]. That is, this committee is mainly 
responsible for the evaluation of the business cases of 
IT-related projects. Yet, the role of the digital 
strategy think tank is different from the roles 
described in academic literature. This committee’s 
responsibility is to keep an eye on the impact of 
technological developments on the university and 
consider how societal and market challenges could be 
addressed leveraging technology. Hence, it seems 
that the list of roles described in literature is not 
exhaustive. Thus, defining the possible roles of IT 
oversight committees is an interesting topic for future 
research. 
As previously mentioned, various theoretical 
perspectives are applied to examine board level IT 
governance, implying different board roles: control, 
service and resource dependence. This case study 
also demonstrates how the board of directors could 
execute these roles through IT oversight committees.  
The control role of the board with regard to IT 
governance, based on agency theory, entails that the 
board should monitor the IT-related actions and 
decisions of management [20, 25]. In order to 
adequately perform this control role, board members 
should have the right competencies to challenge the 
responses of management, which is often not the case 
[20, 25, 29, 31]. Moreover, the information 
asymmetry between the board and management 
should be reduced to a minimum [31]. At the 
University of Antwerp, the control role is mainly 
assigned to the IT governance committee. The 
problems of limited IT-related knowledge and 
information asymmetry are coped with through the 
support of the investment office. The investment 
office ensures that the necessary information reaches 
the IT governance committee. On top of that, they 
prepare decisions by evaluating investments using a 
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scoring model, which was approved by the IT 
governance committee. IT expertise is necessary to 
fill in this scoring model, but not to use the results. 
That way, the IT governance committee can 
adequately perform its control role, regardless of its 
limited IT expertise. 
Stewardship theory implies that the board also has 
a service role, which entails duties like advising 
management on matters such as IT strategy, helping 
them fund strategic opportunities and responding to 
management requests [26, 27]. In the case of the 
university, the digital strategy think tank is entirely 
focused on this board responsibility. More 
specifically, this committee provides guidance to 
management on IT strategic opportunities and 
challenges.  
Various authors have presented the resource-
based view of the firm and the resource dependence 
theory as perspectives to examine board level IT 
governance [26, 28, 31], suggesting that board 
members can be valuable resources for the 
governance of IT. This case study demonstrates this 
board member value and the potential role of a 
committee to unfold or even maximize it. Due to the 
nature of the selection process of board members at 
the university of Antwerp, it is very difficult to 
deliberately balance the expertise within the board. 
Yet, the university was able to select one non-
executive director with significant IT expertise. The 
impact of this one director has increased considerably 
with the creation of the digital strategy think tank. 
This smaller committee offers a perfect platform for 
this director to have a substantial impact and deliver 
value by adding an outside perspective and 
significant IT expertise. Because of this platform that 
was designed to hold discussions regarding long term 
IT developments, the value that this IT savvy director 
can deliver is maximized.  
This study also provides some insights on 
possible IT oversight committee arrangements. 
Current research suggests the establishment of one IT 
oversight (or similar) committee, in some cases 
supported by the audit or risk committee. 
Nevertheless, the university decided to create two IT 
oversight committees at the level of the board. 
Although this is in conflict with existing guidance, it 
is an interesting approach as it allows the 
organization to clearly separate different 
responsibilities and adapt committee membership 
accordingly. In this specific case, the responsibilities 
of portfolio management on the one hand and a 
ensuring forward-looking, outside-in approach on the 
other hand are divided over two committees. For the 
former, the efficient management of the IT-enabled 
investment portfolio, the university needed 
representatives of both business and IT. Furthermore, 
it was crucial to include a broad delegation of 
members, covering a wide range of university 
entities. However, the membership needs of the 
digital strategy think tank are entirely different. Here, 
a certain level of IT expertise is crucial as well as the 
competence to think about long term strategies. That 
is why for instance a non-executive director with 
significant IT expertise is included. Moreover, the 
type of discussions held at this committee requires a 
smaller amount of members.  
 
7. Limitations and future research 
 
Several limitations should be acknowledged. 
First, a single case study is described. It might be 
interesting to be able to examine multiple 
organizations and compare various IT oversight 
committee arrangements. However, a single case 
enabled us to describe the context and features of the 
IT oversight committees at the university in detail. 
Second, the University of Antwerp is still at the 
beginning of its board level IT governance journey. 
Future research should also include studies of 
organizations with more mature board level IT 
governance arrangements. 
This case study provides various new insights on 
IT oversight committees at the level of the board that 
could spark additional research. First, the summary of 
existing literature on this topic reveals that different 
roles of IT oversight committees are described by 
different authors. In addition, this case study suggests 
an additional role that was not yet mentioned in 
academic literature. Defining the various roles a 
committee could take up might enable us to create a 
better understanding of how such a committee could 
be a valuable asset and, as a consequence, stimulate 
board members to establish this kind of structure.  
Second, we provide an example of how a board 
level committee, in this case the IT governance 
committee, is supported by a committee at another 
level in the organization, i.e. the investment office. 
The cooperation of committees at different levels in 
the organization deserves more attention. More 
broadly speaking, the dynamics between governance 
mechanisms at the level of the board and at lower 
levels is a crucial research topic. Indeed, a holistic 
approach towards IT governance is essential [11]. 
Furthermore, the dynamics between executive 
management and  the board of directors has been a 
well-researched topic within corporate governance 
research [1, 2, 23, 24]. Similarly, we should not 
consider board IT governance mechanisms in a 
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vacuum, but examine their relationship to the 
governance system in the rest of the organization. 
Third, this case study suggests that the modus 
operandi of an IT oversight committee highly 
depends on the role it assumes. Consequently, future 
research should examine different committee 
arrangements and how they relate to the committee 
role. 
Fourth, in this research we examine how boards 
of directors can operationalize their IT governance 
duties, but what about reporting on this topic? As 
research indicates that board level IT governance 
leads to increased organizational performance [13, 
26] and theories such as voluntary disclosure theory 
and agency theory predict that firms can improve 
their liquidity and firm valuation through better 
information intermediation [12], organizations could 
benefit from IT governance disclosure [15]. As a 
consequence, how boards report on their involvement 
in IT governance could be an interesting topic for 
future research. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The goal of this research was to open up the black 
box of IT oversight (or similar) committees at the 
level of the board of directors. More specifically, we 
used a case study to provide insights on the role and 
modus operandi of such committees. We concluded 
that an IT oversight committee can take up various 
roles, depending on the organization’s needs. 
Furthermore, the board can execute its control, 
service and resource dependence roles through such a 
committee. The case study also provided inspiration 
with regard to the workings of an IT oversight 
committee. That is, the board can establish multiple 
committees in order to separate responsibilities. 
Clearly, membership should be adapted according to 
the responsibilities the committee assumes.  
With this research, we contribute to the IT 
governance knowledge base in several ways. First, 
we found that both researchers and practitioners 
agree that boards of directors can no longer delegate 
their IT governance related responsibilities, yet, few 
boards engage in governing IT. We contribute to 
closing this knowing doing gap by focusing on the 
most frequently mentioned guideline in academic 
research.  
Second, none of the existing research on board 
level IT governance reports on governance practices 
observed in a specific organization in detail. Instead, 
descriptive research regarding this topic currently 
includes reports of large data sets containing 
information on the mechanisms deployed and 
perceptions of board members resulting from surveys 
and interview with individual board members. With 
regard to research on IT oversight committees at the 
level of the board, we found only few studies that 
report on the current state of practice. These studies 
simply report on the presence of an IT oversight 
committee and provide some quotes of board 
members expressing their opinion on the need for 
such a committee [7, 13, 17]. Hence, this is the first 
in-depth study on IT oversight committees, providing 
the details and context of this governance mechanism 
in a specific organization.  
Third, because we are the first to take an in-depth 
look at IT oversight committees, many new and 
interesting paths for future research surface.  
We contribute to practice by inspiring boards and 
board members who are attempting to increase their 
engagement in IT governance. Especially those 
boards with a limited amount of IT expertise. While 
enhancing the IT expertise within the board is a 
popular, and probably the most obvious, strategy to 
increase and improve the involvement of the board in 
IT governance, it can be very difficult. An alternative 
way to get started is creating an IT oversight 
committee, involving people with IT expertise from 
different layers of the organization. Moreover, an IT 
oversight committee ensures the involvement of the 
board in the IT debate. We provide boards with clear 
and applicable guidance on the possible organization 
and role of such an IT oversight committee. 
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